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1 Introduction
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research at the Naval
Postgraduate School (CISR) has established and is vigorously pursuing a multifaceted
research and development project to provide an openly distributed worked example of
how high assurance trusted computing components can be built.  The Trusted Computing
Exemplar project (TCX) encompasses four related activities: creation of the High
Assurance Rapid Development Environment (HARDE) prototype; development of a
reference-implementation trusted computing component (the TCX Separation Kernel);
evaluation of the component for high assurance; and open dissemination of results related
to the first three activities.
This document presents a brief overview of the TCX Separation Kernel design (see
Section 2), and provides a summary of TCX developments that have occurred in financial
year 2004 – October 2003 through September 2004.   Significant progress on the
development environment is described in Sections 3 and 4.  System development and
evaluation progress are described in section 5.  Our high-level design requirements have
been defined synergistically with a Common Criteria protection profile for separation
kernels. Work on open dissemination of TCX project results is included in
“Documentation Integration Environment,” in Section 2. Portions of that environment
will eventually be integrated into the dissemination system.
2 Background
2.1 TCX Project Goals and History
Over the past decade, neither the private sector nor the US Government have been
significantly involved in high assurance Trusted Computing acquisitions and research.
During this time, the focus on commercial-off-the-shelf procurements by these sectors
has helped to fuel explosive advances in commercial technology, but it also contributed
to the lack of progress in the ability of commercial systems to appropriately protect
themselves and the data with which they are entrusted. No new high assurance (viz.
TCSEC Class A1 or Common Criteria EAL6/7) systems have been fielded. While
industry has been driven to supply the latest technology at the fastest pace, it has not been
motivated, either internally or externally via customer demand, to produce highly
trustworthy computing systems.  As a result, the National Information Infrastructure is
weak; there are no contemporary high security, high assurance, off-the-shelf products
available that can be used to strengthen it; and the National capability to design and
construct such trusted computer systems and networks has atrophied.  To help address
these shortcomings, we have established the Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX)
project.
The concept of TCX was developed in 2002 and 2003. Project work commenced in 2004,
with a combination of funding from several national sources (see Appendix B).  Today,
we have more than 14 research, engineering and support personnel, as well as many
graduate students, working on the TCX project.
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2.2 TCX Design Overview
Our approach is to develop a high assurance separation kernel, along with a trusted
application built to be hierarchically layered [dijkstra68] on the Kernel, as a reference
implementation exemplar system for trusted computing.  The high-level requirements of
the TCX Separation Kernel (TCX-SK) are for a small, portable component that will take
advantage of modern hardware support, where applicable, and that will provide users
with correct security operation and an a priori assurance against system subversion.  To
demonstrate the Kernel’s utility, a high assurance network authenticator will be
developed as the application portion of the Trusted Computing Exemplar system.
2.2.1 TCX Kernel
The primary security function of TCX-SK will be to enforce process and data-domain
separation, while providing primitive operating system services sufficient to support
simple applications.  The embedded focus of the kernel drives several high-level design
characteristics.  The kernel will be small but complete with respect to policy
enforcement. It will have a static runtime resource configuration and its security policy
regarding access to resources will be based on static process/resource access bindings,
which are subject to offline configuration. We anticipate that the kernel will support a
small number of processes, data objects, and I/O devices. A “RAM disk” can be
constructed from storage resources, but there is no plan to support a hard drive. Below,
we provide a few more details about our view of the kernel.
Application processes will be scheduled in a round robin fashion with each process being
given a predetermined amount of time, set by the configuration. The process/resource
access binding mechanism within the kernel will allow the assignment of specific modes
of access, such as modify and observe, by which a process may access a particular
resource. A variety of policies can be represented by this method, including one
indicative of a lattice of security domains [denning76a].
The kernel will provide mechanisms to handle asynchronous interrupts. Any I/O will be
handled by the kernel and presented to processes via memory segments.
Processes may communicate through shared memory segments that at least one can write
and the other can read, or through simple process synchronization primitives, which can
be implemented to be demonstrably free of covert channels [reed79, levin90].
The static nature of resource allotment allows the TCX-SK to both minimize internal
runtime activity that could form the basis of covert channels between processes
[kemmerer82], and to provide more predictable processing behavior, than would
otherwise be possible.
2.2.2  Demonstration Application: the Trusted Path Extension
The demonstration system - a demonstration application running on the TCX-SK,
including a small form-factor hardware base - is a high assurance network authentication
device, for communicating security critical information between a user and a remote
secure server, such as in the MYSEA distributed security architecture (see Figure 1
[irvine04b]).  This trusted path extension (TPE) device interfaces between a specially
configured COTS workstation and the network. The TPE application provides
authentication and session negotiation services with which users can establish trusted
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sessions with the server, as well as cryptographically protected communications between
the TPE and the secure server.  Once logged on through TPE, user sessions at the
workstation may interact with the secure server, as limited by the negotiated security
parameters (e.g., military session level, or enterprise group membership). For this
architecture, the workstation does not need to be trusted to support security critical
services.
Figure 1. MYSEA System Architecture: Client-TPE-Server.
Hosting of the TPE on a separate, small form-factor device provides several benefits.
First, the device processor and memory are physically separate from the workstation, so
that there is no question of interference from user processes.  Second, trusted path
functions need to have absolute control of the screen and keyboard to ensure that the user
is communicating directly with the trusted computing base. Since the TPE device has its
own screen and keyboard, we can ensure that trusted path I/O functions are completely
controlled without having to analyze the potentially complex mechanisms of the
workstation screen and keyboard.  Third, the secure attention key design, through which
the user signals that s/he desires to communicate with the TCB, is straightforward relative
to attempting to utilize keystrokes from a standard workstation keyboard.
3 Product Life Cycle
The product life cycle determines many aspects of what, when, how, and by whom the
project is to proceed.  During 2004, a set of TCX life cycle-related documents was
completed, as follows.
3.1.1 Life Cycle Plan
The overall purpose and guiding principle for this document is to provide a methodology
that will result in the creation of a product that will have a high level of assurance that its
security policies are sound and correctly implemented. A secondary purpose for this
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document is to ensure compliance with the Common Criteria (CC) requirements for
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 7. [cc04]  This plan is the overarching high-level
document that guides a product throughout its life cycle, from its initial conception to its
eventual retirement, by defining policy, process, and high-level procedures.
3.1.2 Configuration Management Plan
This document describes the procedures and policy for Configuration Management (CM)
of TCX.  This document and the measures it describes are also intended to satisfy the
Common Criteria (CC) Configuration Management requirements for EAL6 and above.
The objectives of this CM plan include: ensuring the integrity of the configuration items,
tracking changes to the configuration items, and ensuring only authorized changes are
made to the configurations items. The items to be managed under this plan include any
documents, source code, specifications, and other items written, used or developed,
including bug reports, security flaws, and development tools, as part of the product
development process.
3.1.3 Configuration Management Procedures
The purpose of this document is to outline the procedures for the Configuration
Management (CM) process. These procedures are meant to provide lower-level details
necessary to implement the process laid out in the Configuration Management Plan, and
to ensure consistency in the exercise of the process. Additional procedures are provided
to interface with CM-specific applications.  Drafts of the CM system design and
assembly document, and the CM system user’s guide were completed and are already in
use to train CM staff.
3.1.4 Physical and Personnel Security Plans
Because of the nature of the project, integrity is the primary policy concern of these
plans, though confidentiality is not disregarded (e.g., with respect to unintended
dissemination of incomplete articles).
• The purpose of the Physical Security Plan is to define policies necessary to ensure the
physical protection of the TCX during its entire life cycle.
• The purpose of the Personnel Security Plan is to define personnel policies necessary
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TCX data during its entire life cycle.
4 High Assurance Rapid Development Environment
The TCX High Assurance Rapid Development Environment (HARDE) consists of a
documentation integration environment with which to define and describe TCX project
documents, development tools and procedures with which to build TCX software, and
verification tools with which to determine with high assurance whether the system that is
built is as was defined.  Significant progress was made in all of these areas in 2004.
4.1 Software Development Tools, Procedures and Standards
We have completed the requirements analysis, design, and construction of a prototype for
the software development environment.  Setup procedures for the software development
environment are being defined.  We have also completed the software development
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standards document, which includes (1) processes for designing, approving and
developing Configuration Items in conformance with the CM Plan, as well as (2) the
TCX coding standards.
The prototype development server was assembled to run Windows Server 2003 Standard
Edition software and the OpenWatcom compiler.  Support for distributed development
was also configured, to be accessible through both Linux and Windows clients.
4.2 Documentation Integration Environment
We have established initial high-level requirements for the Documentation Integration
Environment (DIE).  These requirements include the following:
• The DIE must provide or support interfaces, schemas, and templates suitable for
all document types and formats required by the Documentation Standards.
• The DIE must support a hierarchy of documentation resources, as well as the
ability to map specific requirements and product features at one level of the
hierarchy to requirements and features at another level.
• The DIE must be able to validate the proper conformance of resources to project
schemas and other standards.
• The DIE must provide a mechanism for extracting project resources by name,
resource ID, and version from the CM system to individual workspaces, as well as
an interface for checking in modified resources to the CM system.
• The DIE must provide on-request invocation of testing, compiling and
verification tools, while maintaining the integrity of the original resource.
• The DIE must provide both current and published views of the documents in the
project. These views must be identical to the designated current and published
versions maintained by the CM system.
The specifications and implementation of the initial version of the DIE have been
completed, and the DIE is in use by the project team for the creation and requirements
mapping of project documents.
4.3 Verification Tools
In 2004, the TCX verification tool requirements were defined, the verification server and
several candidate tool sets were assembled, and analysis proceeded toward selection of
the verification tool set for the project.
The purpose of the TCX verification tool requirements document is to describe the
requirements for the software tools that will be used for the verification of the TCX
Kernel.  Verification includes creation of the following “system representations:” system
security policy, system functional requirements, formal security policy model, formal
high-level design specification for each subsystem, semi-formal low-level design
specification for each subsystem.
Verification also involves various forms of analysis regarding the system representation
documents, such as covert channel analysis, formal proof of the model and formal, semi-
formal or informal proof of correspondence between different representations (depending
on the level of formality of the particular representations).
Tools and requirements for automated support of the verification analyses have been
defined, including:
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• Specification language syntax checker
• Theorem prover
• Requirements mapping system (part of DIE, above)
• Non-determinism checker
• Information flow analyzer
• Shared resource matrix generator
We have procured and configured a server to act as the verification server, and have
installed several verification tool suites onto it, including FDM, PVS, and ACL2.
Investigation and experimentation is ongoing to determine suitability of each tool suite
for the verification of high assurance systems models and specifications.
5 System Design and Development
The high-level policy and requirements definition for the TCX-SK has been completed.
These requirements have been developed in conjunction with the generic requirements
definition (viz., Protection Profile) of a class of high assurance separation kernels
[nsa04].  Since the TCX project will be able to utilize the Protection Profile during the
TCX-SK evaluation process, our participation in the development of that profile provides
progress for both our system design activity and the product evaluation activity.
For Common Criteria evaluation, a security target document is required that provides
further detail about the implementation than does the Protection Profile.  We have
produced a first draft of the TCX-SK Security Target.  The security target will help guide
the other system design documents (see “system representation documents,” under
Verification Tools, above).
Finally, in conformance with our configuration management plan (see “Product Life
Cycle,” above), we have completed initial versions of the TCX Project Configuration
Item List, and the TCX-SK Configuration Item List.
6 Future Plans
In the next year we expect to make significant progress in several TCX project activities.
In the TCX High Assurance Rapid Development Environment (HARDE) area, we will
transition the software development environment  into use for TCX development.  The
DIE will be enhanced with further functionality, and be integrated with the CM system.
Also, final selection and configuration of the verification tools will occur.
In the System design and development area, we expect to formulate the system
architecture and system functional requirements next year, as well as begin work on the
formal security policy model  and formal high-level design specifications. We will also
develop the high-level policy and requirements definition for the TPE.
Finally, we will design and prototype the dissemination system, to include access to the
documentation structure of the DIE.
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